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Abstract: Emmanuel Levinas argues that moral responsibility is enacted in the encounter 
between two people. Increasingly, however, encounters take place online and, rather than 
between two people, are mediated by virtual representatives known as avatars. In this paper I 
explore the theoretical conditions for grounding encounters between users mediated by these 
online proxies, and the extent that they can be convincingly cast as moral. First, I draw on 
aesthetic theory in order to argue that online environments in which such interactions occur 
can gesture towards the moral responsibilities experienced in the offline world. Second, I 
explore ways of grounding the encounter in these online environments through theories of 
signification, ultimately utilising Jean-Franҫois Lyotard’s notion of the tensor read alongside 
the Levinasian ethical demand. Altogether, this paper attempts to provide an articulation of the 
very possibility of responsibility enacted and mediated through avatars and, as such, focuses 
upon the basic conditions of moral life online in order to provide a theoretical grounding. 
 





Avatar Ethics: Beyond Images and Signs 
 
Since Neal Stephenson used the term in his cyberpunk novel Snow Crash (2002), originally 
published in 1992, “avatar” has become widely employed to define the sign through which we 
socialise online. Mathias Klang writes: “The online character is often seen as a reflection of 
the offline self and is in literature referred to as the avatar since it is a manifestation of the self 
in this online world” (2004, p. 390). (“Avatar” comes from the Sanskrit meaning manifestation 
of God.) Stephen Webb offered an early analysis of the avatar used in a now defunct chat site, 
with the avatars in question being photographs, cartoons, or animations of users. For David J. 
Gunkel (2010, p. 128) an avatar is simply a representation of the user that can be interacted 
with by other users; this is a definition so broad that it could conceivably include any form of 
identification online, from the profiles and photographs that make up a large part of social 
networking to an animated rendering of the user in a graphical world. For L. D. Falvey (2011, 
p. 56) it is one of the “‘real life’ signs” employed by users in order to participate in social 
behaviours. What all these accounts – and many more – have in common is that they conceive 
of the avatar as a social entity utilised in social environments; it can be still or animated, 
photographic or graphic; and it stands in for the user as a proxy. It is through avatars that we 
socialise online, maintaining friendships, conversations, or shared interests (such as playing 
games or sharing hobbies). 
 
However, the idea that encounters between users can take place through these proxies is not 
unproblematic. Slavoj Žižek argues that, by dint of online design, we need a representation of 
ourselves for virtual interaction (an avatar) but it is one that can never fully represent us: “The 
other is thus purely virtual: no longer a true, living, intersubjective other, but an inanimate 
screen, a stand-in” (1999, p. 107). This is, according to Žižek, too passive to constitute an 
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encounter. We never really encounter the other, just the manipulated and fabricated signals sent 
through a computer (Žižek 1999, p. 108). The nature of the interface – between avatars, via a 
computer or mobile device screen – “means that my relationship to the Other is never face-to-
face” (Žižek 1999, p. 113). If the avatar is merely an “interface simulacrum” (Žižek 1999, p. 
109) and the face-to-face impossible online, then what I want to argue first is that it poses a 
problem for the application of the ethical encounter, as found in the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas. I will then argue that we can begin to rehabilitate Levinasian ethics online if we reject 
his stance that images are not morally provoking by turning to the aesthetic theory of Aristotle 
(and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s return to this classic account) and Immanuel Kant. This will allow 
us to conceive of online environments as moral spaces. Finally, I will argue that avatars as 
extensions of the self allow for an ethical encounter to occur between two users. This demands 
a return to theories of signification and I will conclude by appropriating from Jean-Franҫois 
Lyotard the notion of the tensor, a kind of sign that allows for a visceral meeting of bodies, but 
emphasising a moral dimension lacking in Lyotard’s radical account of signification by reading 
it alongside Levinas’ moral philosophy. This will give us a theoretical underpinning for the 
idea that encounters take place online and that these encounters are sufficient to ground moral 
responsibility without physical proximity. It should be noted at this point that this is very much 
a groundwork rather than a sustained engagement with moral problems encountered though 
avatar interaction (cyberbullying, deception, etc.); the focus is the sine qua non of moral life 
online and so it is beyond the scope of this paper to move beyond the theoretical conditions 







It is in the face-to-face – thrown into doubt online by Žižek – that Levinas grounds 
responsibility, this notion of responsibility constituting being-towards (or being-for) another 
person. For Levinas (2007), the face-to-face encounter with the other person (“other”) puts the 
individual (the “I”) in a relation with infinity. In simple terms, the “I” is confronted by 
something (the other) which escapes her ability to fully comprehend, meaning that it cannot be 
totalised in thought – there is always something that cannot be known, infinity (see Caygill 
2006). Levinas writes: “The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the 
other in me, we here name face” (2007, p. 50). That is to say that it is the face of the other that 
expresses this infinite dimension, the face of the other that makes the “I” aware that what is 
before her is something beyond her control – something that resists her. What this expression 
of infinity – of complete otherness – conveys, then, is that before the “I” is another being whose 
motives and desires remain opaque and so towards whom “I” should act in a way that does not 
do violence to those hidden intentions. Levinas calls this the “calling into question of my 
spontaneity”, that is, the imposition of limitations on one’s own freedom or, simply, “ethics” 
(2007, p. 43). 
 
Whilst on one level this encounter with the other leads the “I” to act with a sense of 
responsibility as to how those actions impact upon the other, on another level responsibility 
becomes more active – it becomes response. The face is always expressive of the need for 
responsibility towards the other but when it becomes expressive of suffering it becomes a call 
to the “I” to respond in some way to expiate this suffering, to take responsibility for the 
alleviation of that suffering. The suffering expressed by the face of the other “imposes on me 
and I cannot stay deaf to its appeal, or forget it, […] I cannot stop being responsible for [the 
other’s] desolation” (Levinas 2006a, p. 32). For Levinas, the mute expression of the face is 
fundamentally moving but he also sees the dialogic call for help as being a profound ethical 
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event, where speech acts as a kind of moral signification that demands a response. In both cases 
this response is immediate, in the sense that it occurs in the moment and without reflection; 
Levinas’ is an anti-foundational ethics in that it does not operate on moral prescriptions – or 
even judgement. First, any sort of moral guidance would be general – pertaining to the same – 
rather than suitable for the specific other who is in need; and second, given the fundamental 
aloofness of the other, we can never know that the way we respond is correct or possess any 
knowledge from which to judge the right course of action. So the encounter with the other 
arouses the goodness of the “I” in the moment and response must be immediate, both 
temporally and in the sense of without recourse to moral mediation or advice. This kind of 
response is the “gesture” of ethics (Levinas 2007, p. 174). 
 
Whilst Julia Hell (2010, p. 145) has noted, and Zygmunt Bauman (in Dawes 2011, p. 131) has 
confirmed, that there is a connection, in Levinas, between looking at the other and being moved 
to respond to the other, Levinas himself saw limitations to this specular dimension of ethics. 
Across both his Totality and Infinity (2007) and Otherwise Than Being (2008b) Levinas argues 
that the face of the other – so vital for ethical encounters – cannot be represented as an image. 
The face is the focal point of the expression of otherness but for something to be represented 
is for it to be made intelligible – and what is made intelligible no longer remains as other. 
Levinas calls this the “imperialism of the same” (2007, p. 59), a totalising process. Since 
Levinas’ ethics is based on the encounter with the other as other, anything that would translate 
this otherness into an intelligible same cannot be part of the moral realm. This, for Levinas, 





This abstract philosophical argument about otherness and image is supplemented by Levinas 
with some more grounded observations in his essay “Reality and its Shadow” (2006b). 
Levinas’ focus in this piece is on art and literature but the conclusions he draws here are, I 
suggest, responsible for the tout court dismissal of the value of images in his two major works 
of ethics. He writes: “The most elementary procedure of art consists in substituting for the 
object its image”; in turn, the image “neutralizes” the object (Levinas 2006b, p. 3). Any object 
turned into an image becomes a non-object, a sensation. It resembles the object, like a shadow 
or an “allegory of being” (Levinas 2006b, p. 6). In an artwork, says Levinas, the presence of 
that which resembles the object – the spots of colour or slabs of marble – only serve to point 
to the absence of the object. For Levinas, the image of the other is a sign that the other is not 
there, that there can be no encounter with this absent other. Whereas the face of the other 
presents only itself to the “I” in the encounter, opening up a moral relationship, the image of 
the other is a representation, a shadow, an allegory – a non-other. 
 
Additionally, for Levinas, there is something troubling about this image of the (absent) other. 
He writes: “every image is in the last analysis plastic, and [...] every artwork is in the end a 
statue – a stoppage of time, or rather its delay behind itself” (Levinas 2006b, p. 8). In the 
statuesque image, “an instant endures infinitely”; for example, “the Mona Lisa will smile 
eternally” but it is a smile that never broadens (Levinas 2006b, p. 9). In this suspended instant 
nothing can ever happen. This has two effects: first, the “I” cannot respond immediately to the 
image of the other because such a response has a temporal dimension which is here frozen; and 
second, the statuesque image of the other is incapable of expression (Robbins 1999, p. 84). 
Like the Mona Lisa’s smile, the expression of the face will never fully form and likewise the 
words to which the “I” would respond are stuck in a mouth that cannot speak. There is nothing 




These, then, are the three arguments that Levinas puts forward to dismiss images of the other 
from the moral sphere: first, they translate otherness into the same; second, their presence 
highlights only the absence of the other; and, finally, their frozen quality makes response 
impossible. Immediately the last of these arguments appears untenable if applied to the avatar, 
which returns expression to the image. The animated avatar used in graphical worlds is not 
frozen and, although expressions cannot be as subtle as they are offline, the use of text-based 
chat or speech through a microphone returns what Jill Robbins calls the “language-response to 
the other” (1999, p. 54; see also Boothroyd 2005 for an account of language as hospitality 
towards the other). The profile avatars used in social networking do indeed contain frozen 
images but they also allow for language-response through text conversation which, since the 
image is the focal point and not the entirety, is indissociable from the avatar. The other two 
arguments require more sustained critical reflection, since the first would cast virtual 
environments as an amoral shadow world whilst the second would suggest that the avatar is 
incapable of signifying the other person it is intended to stand in for. To overcome the former 
we need to rethink how images relate to otherness, which is the work of the next section; and 
for the latter, we need to ground the encounter between two users such that avatars are not mere 





In what follows I will first utilise the aesthetic theory of Aristotle and Hans-Georg Gadamer to 
argue that, whilst the other may not be encountered herself, images can gesture towards 
responsibilities; and, second, through Immanuel Kant’s analytic of the sublime, I will argue 
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that the unintelligible – otherness – can be gestured towards by the image. Taken together, it 
will then be possible to argue that images of others online gesture towards the responsibility 
we are confronted with in the encounter with the other. Whilst this is not sufficient to hold that 
encounters between users take place, it will allow us to conceive of graphically- and 
photographically-rendered environments as sites in which responsibility is cultivated.  
 
2.1. Imitation and Gesture 
 
Aristotle’s famous work on the aesthetic in his Poetics (1997) was written in response to Plato’s 
dismissive account of art as imitation in his Republic (1997). Plato’s argument was that art was 
doubly inferior, since it was an imitation of something that was an imitation (the sensible 
world) of the real thing (the forms). Aristotle took this notion of imitation and explored what 
value it might have to those who contemplate art (drama in particular). He argued that it is 
through imitation that we learn – as children learn through imitation play – and so through the 
imitation of something in art we learn about the thing that is imitated. Aristotle writes that “the 
reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves 
learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, ‘Ah, that is he’” (1997, p. 6). This last part – the “Ah, 
that is he” – is both vital to our present study of avatars and a little misleading. For it is not the 
person depicted that we learn about but of the actions and character of people. At the same 
time, not all art has an ethical function which is to say, for Aristotle, that it is not all educative 
of character. In those dramas (or paintings, as we will see presently through the work of 
Gadamer) that do have an ethical function, regardless of their trueness to life or not, lessons 
are learned about moral decisions: “Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing 
what kind of things a man chooses or avoids” (Aristotle 1997, p. 13). Whilst works of art that 
exaggerate moral character are obviously fictive, the function they play is not so much in 
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depicting things as they are or as they are perceived to be but how they ought to be (Aristotle 
1997, p. 53). So, contemplation of a drama or a painting that depicts moral heroism or failing 
educates about what ought to be done whilst scenes of suffering arouse pity; in short, art can 
be ethical and our experience of things imitated is no less powerful than of things themselves 
when it comes to moral education. 
 
Whilst the work of Aristotle shows that art was regarded as possessing an ethical quality early 
in the Western philosophical tradition, it is Gadamer’s reassessment of this work that begins to 
challenge Levinas’ dismissal of images. Gadamer (1986c) indirectly approaches Levinas’ 
concern for “the speechless image” by arguing that, although the image of a person is incapable 
of speech, there is nevertheless a kind of language: a gesture. Returning to the Aristotelean 
account of imitation, Gadamer (1986a, p. 99) argues that mimesis makes something present, 
allowing us to recognise something we have already encountered. It is through art, then, that 
our familiarity with the world is deepened; art is a way of maintaining familiarity with a world 
that is “dissolving” all around us (Gadamer 1986a, pp. 100-104). However, art is not a depiction 
of an actual event but a “gesture” that presents the being of the event (Gadamer 1986b, p. 79). 
For example – Gadamer’s (1986b, p. 81) example – Werner Scholz’s painting Antigone is not 
a depiction of the person named Antigone but a gesture representing self-chosen death. 
Symbolic gestures are embedded in the canvas; even when they represent humans the gesture 
remains just the art work – but gesturing towards human reality, towards the inner life of human 
subjectivity. This is only ever a gesture since if the artist could express this in a more robust 
manner – codify it, say – then they would not need to create the art work. “The images before 
us present human life in the language of heraldic emblems and devices” (Gadamer 1986b, p. 
81), and through them we encounter the unfamiliar. Reflecting on modern art, Gadamer writes: 
“Even the art of our own time, whose mute gaze presents us with such disturbing enigmas, 
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remains a kind of recognition: in such art we encounter the undecipherability of our 
surroundings” (Gadamer 1986b, p. 74). 
 
We are now in a position to challenge Levinas’ contention that images are not ethical in nature. 
What Aristotle and Gadamer demonstrate is that images teach us about moral responsibility. 
Not all images, obviously, but where, say, human suffering is depicted in a photograph or 
graphical representation it renews in the instant of viewing the idea within us that the suffering 
of others is unacceptable. Of course, Levinas’ antifoundational ethics has no place for 
indoctrination of values or the learning of moral lessons: ethics is an immediate response to the 
other. But what Aristotle and Gadamer are arguing is not that we can read off prescriptions but 
rather that we gain a familiarity with the moral world – in the same way that we would through 
face-to-face encounters in Levinas’ account. Gadamer’s observation, that our familiarity with 
a world dissolving around us is maintained through art, is particularly interesting in this respect. 
Bauman, in his Modernity and the Holocaust (2007), warned of the disappearance of Levinas’ 
other through bureaucracy and technology, and what we cannot be aware of we cannot be 
responsible for. Today, when technological interaction takes place with physically absent 
others, it is through images – amongst other things – that we maintain a grip on the reality of 
the world, suffering and all. Some images – not all, as Aristotle noted – gesture towards how 
we ought to behave towards people. Levinas is too hasty in his critique of images; if, for 
Levinas, human suffering and the causing of human suffering is inexcusable, then images that 
might convey this – or simply the vulnerability of others – as a universal message should not 
be so readily dismissed as being outside of ethics. If we adopt the Aristotle/Gadamer approach 
then we lose nothing of value from Levinas’ account and begin to gain a more useful conception 




2.2. The Sublime 
 
By returning the gesture to the image we can say that the environment that we share with other 
users is one that keeps us in contact with the reality of moral life. However, the second part of 
Levinas’ dismissal of images from the moral realm remains in place: that they are totalising or, 
in other words, that they neutralise otherness. Now, Gadamer, when he claims that art allows 
for an encounter with the undecipherable, is alluding to the notion of the sublime. In closing 
this section I will explore the idea that the other evokes a feeling akin to that of the sublime 
and that images that can gesture towards that teach us about our relationship to the infinite and 
so our own responsibilities towards other people. 
 
Kant defines the sublime as “a representation of limitlessness” (2008, p. 75), which is to say 
that, unlike the beautiful, which is about quality, the sublime is about quantity. “Sublime is the 
name given to what is absolutely great”; absolutely great here means great beyond all 
comprehension, “a greatness comparable to itself alone” (Kant 2008, p. 78). Chaos, disorder 
and desolation, in so far as their magnitude and power is sufficient, excite the idea of the 
sublime, which “contravene[s] the ends of our power of judgement” and “do[es] violence, as it 
were, to the imagination” (Kant 2008, p. 76). That is, the absolutely great cannot be contained 
in thought and so any attempt to bear it in mind is painful; or: “This excess for the imagination 
[...] is like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself” (Kant 2008, p. 88). We can have no control 
over the might of the sublime object through our minds; the sublime resists “the interest of the 
senses” (Kant 2008, p. 97). Whilst this sublime cannot be presented adequately to the mind, 
that very inadequacy is brought to mind, and so the sublime repels with its violence but also 
attracts with its capacity to show to the individual the mind’s limits: “a negative pleasure” 
(Kant 2008, p. 76), both pleasure and displeasure at once. It is important to note that whilst 
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something like beauty exists in the world – that is, there are things that are beautiful – the 
sublime is found only in our ideas.  
 
This much is well known. Kant goes on to argue, intriguingly, that whatever it is that evokes 
the sublime feeling inspires respect whilst “humility [...] is a sublime temper of the mind” 
(2008, p. 94). Since the sublime cannot present itself to the senses there can be no 
comprehension, only respect and humility: “the sublime [prepares us] to esteem something 
highly even in opposition to our (sensuous) interest” (Kant 2008, p. 98). Without this the 
sublime would be merely terrifying. Not that we get any commands as to how we ought to 
judge when faced with the sublime; there are no rules for judging nor is there any telos or end 
that can be ascertained and worked towards. Since the sublime feeling is the “thrusting aside 
of the sensible barriers” we have only a “presentation of the infinite” (Kant 2008, p. 104). In 
the face of this infinite the only good that can come of it is enthusiasm – the attempt to bear 
witness to this unpresentable – which Kant classifies as a sublime state of mind (2008, p. 102). 
In this way, through humility and enthusiasm, reason can go beyond itself and into the infinite. 
 
Utilising these ideas – the sublime, humility, enthusiasm – within the genre of ethical theory 
will allow us to explain morality through images. What I want to suggest is that the Levinasian 
other evokes a feeling akin to the sublime when encountered by the “I”. Levinas’ other is 
fundamentally unknowable. We cannot comprehend the other as other because comprehension 
would involve the ability to take possession of in thought – and otherness so taken possession 
of can no longer be other. The encounter brings us face-to-face with an abyss of otherness that 
resists the mind’s attempts to contain it, thus showing the limitation of the capacity of thought. 
We are forced beyond totality and into infinity. Levinas writes: “In the idea of the Infinite, 
thought thinks more than it can contain” (2008a, p. 117). This would be a very fine definition 
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of the sublime feeling. Bearing in mind that the sublime feeling exists in ideas and not in nature, 
I propose the following: just as a painting of a vast mountain range evokes the sublime feeling 
felt by the sheer magnitude of that range in nature, so too does the image of the other evoke the 
idea of the infinite experienced in the face-to-face encounter. The problem with Gadamer’s 
account was that it offered a sort of universal responsibility that does not tally with Levinas’ 
ethics. It was too totalising in its approach to responsibility, which would treat all others as a 
homogenised same. Now, though, if we combine the idea of the image as gesturing, of teaching 
us about the world, with the sublime, we can say that where images depict other people they 
remind us of the singularity of the other, the way the other escapes totality: the infinite. The 
image of another person reminds us of how, in the encounter, thought is forced to think more 
than it can contain, that something escapes it. It reminds the viewer that that which escapes 
thought – the other – is beyond her, that she cannot act with unlimited freedom lest it harm 
others. This, we might say, is a sort of moral humility. An image of another person, including 
avatars, is a gesture towards the responsibility we have not to act as if alone in the world. The 
avatars of other users are not necessarily interacted with online in a robust way and so this 
account of gesture and otherness through image allows us to conceive of online environments 
as moral even when it is a matter of shared occupation only. 
 
However, this kind of gesture – a morality lesson without prescription – is not the same as the 
ethical gesture of taking responsibility for the other; being reminded of the encounter with the 
other through an image is not the same as the actual encounter. In the encounter, we are forced 
to think through our response to the other without rules or guidance (because every other is 
absolutely other and so no rules could pertain universally), to judge (i.e. to make moral 
decisions) without criteria of judgement – what we might call moral enthusiasm. As such, we 







With this account of moral humility through images we have taken a first step towards giving 
avatar interaction the nature of an ethical encounter; by conceptualising the online environment 
as one in which images gesture towards responsibility we have unlocked the door – but we 
cannot yet walk through it. If we understood online interaction purely in the terms outlined 
above then it would still be with what Žižek called interface simulacra; ethically significant, 
yes, but disconnected from the other person herself. In what follows, I will explore the viability 
of grounding the encounter through forms of signification, dismissing both the index and the 
icon but taking from these wrong-turns guidance towards what I think is the most satisfactory 




Ken Hillis, in his Online a Lot of the Time (2009), deploys a Peircian notion of index in order 
to explain the relation of the avatar to the user. It is worth returning to the work of Charles 
Sanders Peirce on the trichotomy of signs in order to see why this does not work. For Peirce 
(1955, pp. 99-100) a sign is that which stands in for something (an object) for someone (the 
person the sign addresses). This sign then creates in the mind of that person another sign: an 
idea. This idea is an interpretation of the sign and stands in for the object in the same way as 
the sign does. Crucially, a sign, for Peirce, can only represent the object; the sign cannot give 




This broad definition of sign is then split into three kinds: icons, indices, and symbols. In 
Peirce’s words: “An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue 
of characters of its own” (1955, p. 102), which is to say that an icon is a substitute that 
represents its object by similarity or mimicry but the object need not actually exist. “An Index 
is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that 
Object” (Peirce 1955, p. 102); an index has qualities in common with the object such that it 
refers back to it. Indices do not have a significant resemblance to their object but they direct 
attention to the object itself. An index has a “dynamical (including spatial) connection both 
with the individual object, on the one hand, and with the senses or memory of the person for 
whom it serves as a sign, on the other hand” (Peirce 1955, p. 107). An index would lose all 
meaning if its object ceased to exist – but not if there was no-one present to interpret it. Finally: 
“A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an 
association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring 
to that Object” (Peirce 1955, p. 102). A symbol would cease to have meaning if there was no-
one present to interpret it. 
 
Discounting symbols, since they pertain to laws, we might suggest that the avatar is either an 
icon or an index, that is, that it either refers to the user by resembling the user or that it points 
back to the user by virtue of being somehow connected to the user. Peirce’s elaboration on 
these two signs in particular should highlight the distinction: 
 
The Icon has no dynamical connection with the object it represents; it simply 
happens that its qualities resemble those of that object, and excite analogous 
sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness. But it really stands unconnected 
with them. The Index is physically connected with its object; they make an 
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organic pair, but the interpreting mind has nothing to do with the connection, 
except remarking it, after it is established (Peirce 1955, p. 114). 
 
We can see then that the avatar cannot be classified as an icon (in the Peircean sense) if we 
wish to hold that encounters with avatars are also encounters with their users. There is no 
connection between icon and object – avatar and user – if we adopt the avatar-as-icon: there is 
only resemblance. This is further unsatisfactory since not all avatars resemble their users. The 
inability to ground one-to-one encounters through the icon is presumably why Hillis (2009, pp. 
105-109) ignores them and adopts the index as the sign of the user online. The avatar-as-index 
would point back to the user, like a sign-post, fulfilling our desire for the presence of whomever 
we communicate with online (Hillis 2009, p. 109). Peirce noted that photographs were not mere 
resemblances – icons – but rather indices; this was precisely Susan Sontag’s (2008, p. 9) point 
when she claimed that a photograph, by presenting the absence of the photographed, pointed 
to their presence elsewhere. Yet it is far from clear that the notion of index in the avatar context 
really does give us a “metaphysics of presence”, as Hillis (2009, p. 109) puts it. The very fact 
that there needs to be a sign demonstrates that the user is not herself encountered. What we 
would get from the index understanding of the avatar is merely a sign-post that points us in the 
direction of an encounter that is yet to come. Jean-Franҫois Lyotard’s critique of Peirce’s notion 
of the sign, in his Libidinal Economy (2004), is telling in the avatar context. If we follow 
semioticians such as Peirce, writes Lyotard, then we get the following situation: “signification 
itself is constituted by signs alone [...] it comes on endlessly [...] we never have anything but 
references [...] signification is always deferred, meaning is never present in flesh and blood” 
(2004, p. 43). Lyotard laments: “See what you have done: the material is immediately 
annihilated” (2004, p. 43). Peirce’s trichotomy of signs is a “semiotic nihilism” or the “despair 
of lost-postponed meaning” (2004, pp. 45-46) in that meaning is always deferred in an endless 
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series of signs – giving us the sort of nihilism, the deferral of the worldly, that Friedrich 
Nietzsche persistently railed against. If we apply Peircean indices to avatars then someone is 





If index is unsatisfactory for grounding the encounter through avatars then perhaps returning 
to a different conception of icon might point us in the right direction. In his discussion of 
avatars, Falk Heinrich draws comparisons with the Byzantine icon (hereafter just “icon”) in 
order to demonstrate that our troubles pinning down the relation between avatar and user stem 
from a “Western semiotic divide between representational fiction and material reality proper” 
(2010, p. 4). He motivates this comparison by arguing that the digital image used as an avatar 
in, for example, social networking has shifted from having a “reflective” function to a 
“performative” function (2010, p. 4). That is to say, that we may no longer be able to hold, with 
such images, a distinction between depicted and depiction.  
 
Icons were depictions of holy characters – such as saints, Christ, the Virgin Mary – that worked 
both as representation and presentation. For the believer, displaying veneration towards the 
icon was at the same time to venerate the religious character depicted, such that the icon was 
both image and materialisation of that figure. The image then is held to be real, such that the 
distinction between the icon and the saint is collapsed. This relationship was then excluded 
from the Western viewpoint as Renaissance conceptions of art – with a division between reality 
and media – took hold. Heinrich (2010, p. 6) explains that with the icon the depicted emerges 
from the picture and into the material realm of the faithful viewer, projected outwards into their 
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material space. This, he contends, is one way in which we might understand the avatar. The 
user would emerge into the online environment and interact with the other user’s avatar; and, 
the reverse, the other user would emerge into that environment and interact with the user’s 
avatar. However, as Heinrich (2010, p. 8) perceptively points out, this means the interaction is 
not between two users but between the user and the other avatar and the other user and the 
user’s avatar. This is problematic for a notion of ethical encounters between users online. 
Heinrich concludes that we are forced to believe that the other avatar is really the other user, 
just as the worshipper must believe that the icon is really the saint. There is a certain amount 
of faith, he argues, in the reliability of data transmissions through the Internet.  
 
This is unsatisfactory, and not purely, I hope, because of Western bias or scepticism towards 
faith: an ethical encounter online, for it to operate in the same way that it does for Levinas 
offline, would have to take place between two users. Whilst this can be mediated by an 
environment of images, as I have argued above, there must also be an argument for that avatar 
being experienced as the other user herself for there to be an encounter. We need more than to 
blindly believe that we are encountering the other. That said, what is useful in Heinrich’s 
account is the reversal of Hillis’ position: instead of the avatar pointing back to the user, the 
user would here emerge forwards through their avatar; that is, we need to conceive of the 
avatar-sign in a way that does not demand a division between representation and reality. This 




If the problem with indices is that they point back, and with the Byzantine icon that it demands 
faith, what is required is a way of conceptualising the avatar as an extension forwards from the 
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user into a social realm. What is required is a notion of sign that captures the extension of the 
body itself, and this is to be found in Lyotard’s idea of the tensor. Lyotard defines the tensor 
as follows: “At the same time a sign which produces meaning through difference and 
opposition, and a sign producing intensity through force and singularity” (2004, p. 52). This 
requires some unpacking. As Lyotard defines it, the tensor is two things at once: intensity and 
tension. First, the tensor is the extension of the body beyond its organic limitation, projected 
outwards so that it can mingle with other bodies (Lyotard 2004, p. 58). It signifies what Lyotard 
calls the “intensity” of the body, what we might prefer to call “desire” or “drive” or “intention”, 
the representation of otherwise interior propulsions. We can say on the first count that the tensor 
signifies the desires of its author extended beyond the limitations of her corporeality. Second, 
the tensor signifies the meeting point of bodies so extended, the head-on collision of different 
and opposing desires (Williams 1998, p. 95). So, it is both the extension of intensity and the 
point of tension where opposing intensities meet. This takes us beyond the kind of Peircian 
signs that mark the absence of that which they signify, where the encounter with the signified 
is always in abeyance, deferred by the dead signs that signify it. What we get instead is an 
encounter between two bodies, extended beyond themselves by the tensor. They meet in the 
middle as opposing drives. What is useful about the tensor as the meeting-point of these 
extended bodies is that it demands some negotiation between desires where there is conflict, 
the tension of the tensor (Woodward 2011, p. 224). In this way the tensor-sign should be read 
as an ethico-political sign, a site of conflicting interests that requires resolution but – and this 
is crucial and should be familiar to readers of Lyotard – it must be a resolution that does not 
allow for one intensity to be overwhelmed by another, what Lyotard (2007) has called 




What I want to suggest, then, is that the avatar is a tensor. What it signifies is the meeting point 
of two users extended beyond their bodies. This extension should be understood as the intensity 
of the individual, in Lyotard’s idiom, or what we would more commonly think of as her desires 
or intentions. To encounter an avatar is to encounter a sign that stands for the inner-space of 
the user, perceived from the outside as action, language, and reputation. This, I believe, is the 
value of Lyotard’s work here: noting that signs as traditionally conceived represent the deferral 
of the signified he argues instead, with the tensor, that we should see the sign as an outward 
projection of the signified such that instead of absence we get presence, referral rather deferral, 
liveliness rather than a dead marker. Heinrich also attempted this with his idea of the icon but 
that was not without its obvious flaws and it seems more prudent to reconceptualise the sign as 
Lyotard does than to return to a Byzantine concept. By changing the way we think about signs 
we open up the space for a more productive way of thinking about the avatar, one that gives it 
its dues as a continuation of self.  
 
The tensor is not just that extension of the body but also the meeting place of extended bodies; 
not just extended intensity but tension between intensities. This, crucially, when applied to 
avatars, takes us away from the limitations of the “pointing back” of Hillis’ account and the 
“pointing forwards plus faith” of Heinrich’s. Not only is an avatar a tensor, and so an extension 
of its user, but the encounter with the avatar is a tensor, a head-on collision with that extension. 
Two users meet at a point of confrontation, a fundamental collision of two different people’s 
desires. This demands negotiation, the extended intentions, the intensity of the other user 
palpably felt by the opposing user; in this negotiation, this social commerce, a user not only 
encounters the other user’s avatar but the other user’s will, her intensity. So an avatar is a sign 
that there is an other (not mere belief that there is an other) and it is the avatar as focal point 
that is the frontier for encountering and interacting with that other. Again, Lyotard’s conception 
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of the sign recommends itself because it signifies interaction between bodies rather than the 
passive interpretation of the sign that necessitates deferral of the signified. In this way, when 
applied to avatars, we get an encounter between users and not the encounter of one user (the 
“I”) with a disconnected interface simulacrum; we get the presence of the other, and not the 
simulacrum as a reminder of her absence. 
 
The final triumph of the tensor is that it makes the encounter active and not passive, demanding 
interaction and negotiation. If we think of the avatar in these terms then we can say that avatar 
interaction is an ethical encounter. Lyotard’s account of how this negotiation between opposed 
desires in confrontation is to proceed is different to a Levinasian account. For Lyotard, the trick 
is not to resolve the conflict in one party’s favour but to find ways to creatively reformulate the 
problem such that neither side must accede to the other’s terms; that is, Lyotard desires 
dissensus and not consensus, bearing witness to the differend rather than settling the dispute. 
This is clearly different from Levinas’ account of the encounter with another person as a 
confrontation. For Levinas, resolution is simple: the other goes before me, the individual 
responds to the needs of the other rather than to her own desires. I do not think there is a 
problem here: first, Lyotard’s goal is primarily political rather than ethical such that he is 
concerned with difference groups not acquiescing to the demands of imperialist forces rather 
than individuals acting selflessly to prevent or alleviate the suffering of others; second, the idea 
of the tensor as a meeting point of two intensities does not demand Lyotard’s solution to the 
tension, such that it is perfectly consistent to reject his and adopt another if deemed desirable. 
This is not the place to discuss the efficacy of Lyotard’s political project so suffice it to say that 
since the present concern is with ethics it is, at the very least, consistent to seek to explain 
tension in ethical terms where it is ethical in nature (i.e. when the tension is between responding 
to the other or pursuing one’s own projects). And, in those terms, we can say that the encounter 
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with the other person through their avatar is a point at which there is a tension of opposing 
intensities; this confrontation is experienced as a limitation of my freedom to act without 
consideration of how this might run counter to the desires and goals of the other person. The 
tensor as the meeting point of two extended bodies is a sign that consummates my responsibility 
for the other person. More than this, where there is an encounter with an avatar that calls for 
help or that expresses the suffering of its user that responsibility becomes a demand for 
response, a moral enthusiasm. 
 
In short: if the avatar is a tensor then it extends the user forwards such that they can be 
encountered; since the meeting of two users so extended is also a tensor, it is a sign that 
intentions and desires must be limited, that responsibility must be taken not to do harm to the 
intensity of the other (moral humility); and where the encounter with the other (grounded in 
the tensor) brings suffering to attention, that responsibility needs must become a response to 






As new media become more and more integral to the ways we interact with people, avatars 
come to the fore. Whether through social networking sites or webcams or graphic virtual worlds 
the image gains greater importance for how we encounter other people. The images that 
constitute virtual environments should be understood as morally evocative, as gesturing 
towards the concrete reality they represent. By bringing to the mind the sublime otherness of 
the other person they are at the same time a moral lesson: they remind us that the other person 
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ought to be beyond our unfettered desires, that we must limit our own actions so as not to do 
injustice to them. Further, images of suffering are gestures towards the brute fact that the 
suffering of others is inexcusable. These, though, are general lessons, built into the environment 
itself. Unless the avatar can be understood as an extension of a specific person then all we get 
is a sense of general responsibility rather than a responsibility directed towards a particular 
other. The avatar must also signify the other person it stands in for; avatars need to be 
understood as kinds of signs of specific other people. So, I have further argued that the user is 
extended forward by the avatar such that she can be encountered despite the fact that she is not 
physically present. The avatar-as-tensor is a sign that demands contemplation about how one’s 
actions may infringe upon the intentions of the person it represents, and therefore it stands as 
a limitation to one’s freedom. With this work on images and signs complete we can then return 
to a Levinasian notion of responsibility: such limitation is responsibility for the person that 
avatar represents; one’s actions should not harm that other person (what I have called moral 
humility) and, where suffering is expressed, they should be directed towards responding 
appropriately (what I have called moral enthusiasm). By arguing for the moral evocation of 
images and for the extension of the user through the avatar, the avatar-as-tensor, I have 
attempted to show that, contra Žižek, interaction between users is possible in online 
environments and that the ethical encounter can be motivated through avatars. In sum, if we go 
beyond both Levinas’ account of the image and traditional understandings of the sign, then we 
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